Negli anni turbolenti che si attraversano, l'ordinamento costituzionale della Repubblica ha conosciuto un'evoluzione invero singolare, che obbliga a rivedere categorie concettuali anche assai consolidate. In tale contesto, il ruolo del Presidente si contrassegna per un crescente, irresistibile dinamismo, che pare offuscare le attribuzioni di altri organi costituzionali, là dove dal vertice dello Stato promana su taluno di essi un'influenza talvolta poderosa. Considerazioni storiche, politiche e giuridiche s'addensano nella vicenda che ha condotto alla sentenza 1 del 2013 della Corte costituzionale, strumento d'inestimabile valore per leggere fra le righe di una stringente attualità. Vi si colgono, al di là delle soluzioni escogitate per la soluzione del caso concreto, le linee di fondo di un sistema che, in un momento fra i più delicati della sua giovane esistenza, ha più che mai bisogno di “affidarsi” ad un vertice, la cui forza evocativa simbolica, supremo palliativo alla depauperata legittimazione degli organi rappresentativi, necessita – per preservare integra la propria efficacia – di una tutela “speciale”. Grazie alle argomentazioni della Consulta, al Presidente è apprestata copertura “giuridica” per l'esercizio di una funzione politica “al di sopra delle parti” in senso assai ampio che egli, nel torno di tempo intercorso fino ad oggi, segue esercitando; riscuotendo peraltro, all'apparenza, un consenso generale fra le Istituzioni e nel Paese. Condotta, questa, certo salvifica per l'unità dell'ordinamento; non immune però dal rischio di sgretolare, proprio nell'ansia di proteggerle, quelle prerogative che ad altri organi competerebbero, mettendo così a repentaglio i muri maestri dell'edificio repubblicano.
Being elected by a qualified parliamentary majority, the President of the Italian Republic is a super partes magistrate among political actors and is also entrusted with the function to represent the national unity. However, in the last, turbulent decades, the President has developed into a more incisive figure, reportedly inconsistent with the 1948 Constitution. The judgment N° 1/2013 delivered by the Italian Constitutional Court tackles a sensitive topic, as for its legal substance – the discipline of Presidency's conversations privacy – and for the historical background and political scenario coming to the surface. In the summer of 2012, a conversation between a person (former Home Affairs Ministry in 1992-'93) and the President in charge was accidentally wiretapped in the course of a criminal investigation concerning secret negotiations allegedly occurred between State's officers and Mafia heads at that time; such negotiations, it was argued by the Prosecutors, have been crucial to the development and the establishment of the parties of the current political scenario. Although those conversations contained no evidence of a crime and were to be destroyed in the absence of objections by the counterparts, the President raised the question of whether the Prosecutors were infringing Presidency's prerogatives while disclosing them to the parts themselves – thus, to the public. The case has come to the Court as a conflict of constitutional attributions in the meaning of art. 37 of Legge N° 87/1953. The Court, when assessing the infringement of such presidential prerogative, seems to surprisingly incline towards emotional, charismatic legitimacy. In the Court's reasoning, the President's functions may be seen as a “net of relationships”, both formal and informal, that she must entertain in total freedom for the supreme good of national unity. Consequently, it is held, an absolute inviolability of President's communications must be recognised in order to ensure a full exercise of her constitutional duties. If this reasoning were to follow, it would pave the way to a very broad conception of President's functions, which may also encompass the activities falling within its personal sphere. As the President cannot be held responsible for her functional activities unless she is charged with high treason and subjected to impeachment, this would result in narrowing the scope of presidential legal responsibility: the extent to which the President's activities are covered by the functional immunity would depend on the mere President's consideration, insofar as the functionality could only be read in the exclusively teleological dimension of the “national unity”. The judgment entails an over-evaluation of the President's representativeness, turning into a source of legitimacy per se going beyond parliamentary legitimacy. In this view, the President is entitled to influence the activity of other bodies even when they exercise their constitutionally attributed powers, and with little regard of the procedures that are explicitly provided for. An overwhelming charismatic source of legitimate power emerges in the place of parliamentary institutions, whose reputation is at its worst: due to recent scandals and increasing corruption, they suffer a major lack of credibility as well as of deliberative capacity. The Court seems to acknowledge the need for a charismatic figure which could symbolise the State vis-à-vis the people in times of profound crisis affecting the national community – as such, as well as in the context of Western societies – in political-economic, as well as in philosophical and anthropological terms. Paradoxically, whilst aiming at preserving national institutions from collapsing, such charismatic element undermines the pillars of the very same institutions that it is reported to protect.
